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Abstract
In the past decades, three major theories emerged as key motivators in altruistic behaviors:
pure altruism, external motivation, and warm-glow, which refers to utility that people
derive from altruistic actions in a form of warm, positive feeling. Recently, more studies
have focused on understanding warm-glow and its components, such as social image
concern and empathic stimuli, in order to better comprehend and encourage altruistic
behaviors. We propose that responsibility to help is a potential factor that influences
warm-glow from altruistic behavior. In our proposed experimental design, we will test
the hypothesis that people would anticipate less warm-glow if the responsibility to help
is high, but would anticipate more warm-glow if the responsibility to help is low. We also
hypothesize that higher responsibility to help would lead to more altruistic behaviors.
Support for our hypothesis, as shown in the preliminary data, would render significant
implications to charities as their tendency to make people feel responsible to give may
have a tradeoff between increased short-term donation and reduced warm-glow feeling
that donors experience.
Introduction
Traditional economic theories argue that all human beings are motivated exclusively
by material self-interest. According to those theories, altruism, a form of unconditional
kindness, cannot exist in the real world. However, overwhelming evidence in the real world
and experimental settings suggest that concerns for altruism and fairness strongly motivate
people. For example, in the U.S., $373.25 billion- over 2% of U.S. GDP- was contributed to
charity in 2015 alone. 1 Addressing this phenomena, I will reflect on research developments
in the field of altruism and propose a study design that would further our understanding of
real-life altruistic behaviors. The main focus is to understand different factors that amplify
the ‘warm-glow’ and to study effective manipulation of those factors that help encourage
altruistic behaviors in real life.
I will first define “altruism” in the context of psychology studies and will go over
studies that have demonstrated the existence of altruism in various forms. Next, I will briefly
introduce studies on the benefits of altruistic behaviors, which lead to the main topic of this
paper: if altruistic behaviors are beneficial to individuals and society, how can we effectively
motivate people to perform altruistic actions in real life? To address this topic, I will first
highlight different theories on the underlying motivation and psychological process behind
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As reported by giving USA in its 61th edition of Giving USA, and re-printed in the
popular press – see, for example, The Washington Times “Charitable giving reached
record high in 2015: report” October 10, 2016, http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2016/oct/10/charitable-giving-reached-record-high-2015-report/
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altruistic behaviors, where the warm-glow, receiving utility in the form of positive feelings
from the act of giving itself, stands as a crucial motivating force. I will focus on explaining
previous studies that provide insights on different factors that influence warm-glow and
consequently, altruistic behaviors. Lastly, I will identify responsibility to help as a potential
factor that influences warm-glow, and will propose a full experimental design that would
test such relationship. This study would help better understand warm-glow and altruistic
behaviors, especially in the context of charity giving.
Altruism: Which definition to take?
According to Merriam Webster online dictionary, altruism is defined as “feelings and
behavior that show a desire to help other people and a lack of selfishness.” One thing to note
is that altruistic behaviors that we observe in psychology studies are not necessarily ‘selfless’
in a complete sense: people may unconsciously or consciously expect to gain something
out of their altruistic actions, whether that may be a better social reputation, the feeling of
“warm-glow” (Andreoni 1989; 1990), and many others. Therefore, many scholars embrace
a more inclusive definition of altruism, “the willingness to sacrifice one’s own resource in
order to improve the well-being of others” (Fer and Schmidt, 2006). Research that I will
introduce through the rest of the paper have in one way or the other studied altruistic
behaviors where agents willingly sacrifice personal resources to improve the well-being
of specified or unspecified others, regardless of their motive types which can be purely or
partially selfless.
Existence of Altruism in experimental settings
Many behavioral economists and psychologists have used different forms of distribution
games in their experiments to demonstrate the existence of altruistic behaviors. The
ultimatum game developed by Guth et al. (1982) is the classic example, where a proposer
decides on the division of money between himself and the responder, who either accepts
or rejects the proposal. The robust result across hundreds of experiments is that most offers
to the responders were made between 40 and 50 percent of the pie and that about 40 to
60 percent of responders tended to reject proposals offering them less than 20 percent of
the pie (Fer and Schmidt, 2006). Such results demonstrate that not only self-interest but
also a notion of fairness, which is a form of social norm, come into play in determining
people’s behaviors. After all, it seems like such notion of fairness motivates people to act
altruistically.
Different variations and multiple replications of experimental studies have
consistently provided similar results, rendering strong support for the existence of altruism
and fairness concerns in human behaviors. The dictator game is one variation, where it
has been observed that a proposer tends to give a substantial proportion of money to the
unknown responder, despite the fact that the responder has no option but to accept any
amount given by the proposer (e.g. Forsythe et al., 1994). Another game, called Third
Party Punishment Game, has demonstrated that the observer (player C) is willing to
punish unfair behavior by the proposer (player A) at his own cost, demonstrating people’s
strong concerns about fairness of an action regardless of its direct impact on oneself (Fehr
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and Fischbacher, 2004). The robustness of such outcomes has also been substantiated by
manipulation of different variables such as monetary stakes [Fehr and Tougareva, 1995,
Slonim and Roth, 1998, Cameron, 1999] and culture (Buchan et al., 2002) which have
produced statistically consistent outcomes. As shown, different experimental games have
demonstrated that people’s actions strongly accommodate concerns about altruism and
fairness.
Benefits of Altruistic Behaviors
At the same time, many scholars began to study relationships between altruistic actions
and happiness, life satisfaction, or health of both the agents and receivers of such
actions. Multiple surveys and longitudinal studies have shown that acts of kindness (e.g.
volunteering) were strongly correlated with subjective happiness (Otake et al., 2006), mental
health (Schwartz et al., 2003), physical health (Oman et al., 1999) and longevity (Rowe
and Kahn, 1998). More importantly, recent experimental works have started to render
support for a causal relationship between altruistic behaviors and well-being. A study by
Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) showed that simply asking people to commit random acts of
kindness can significantly increase subjective happiness levels for weeks. They randomly
assigned students to an experimental group where students were asked to commit five
random kind acts per week for six weeks and found that students who engaged in kind acts
were significantly happier than those in control group (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). Dunn et
al. (2008) also suggested that participants who were randomly assigned to spend money
in a prosocial manner were happier at the end of the day compared to the others who
spent money on themselves. An interesting feature of this study was that the amount of
money subjects were provided to spend did not correlate with their perceived happiness
at the end of the day, suggesting that the way people spend money is more important for
well-being than the amount of money they received (Dunn et al., 2008). For example, a
minimal amount of five dollars of pro-social purchases was enough to substantially increase
happiness levels (Dunn et al., 2008). The studies above provide us with strong evidence for
the benefits of altruistic actions, which not only redistribute wealth in an economical sense
but also improve well-being of both agents and recipients.
What motivates altruistic behaviors?
As evidence for such benefits piled up, more scholars began to study ways to encourage
more altruistic behaviors (e.g. volunteering, charity giving) in real life. This requires a
fundamental understanding of the underlying motivations behind altruistic actions in
order to identify and manipulate (to our advantage) factors that influence such actions. In
the last two decades, three major theories that are considered key motivators for altruistic
behaviors emerged: external motivation, pure altruism, and warm-glow. First, external
motivation refers to material reward or benefit associated with altruistic actions, such as tax
benefits and thank you cards (Ariely et al., 2009). Second, pure altruism refers to increase of
utility solely from increasing the welfare of others (Ariely et al., 2009). The actor does not
derive utility from any external or internal personal gain but only from the outcome that
recipients’ welfare has increased. Lastly, the individuals motivated by warm-glow receive
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utility from the act of giving itself, as Andreoni puts “people get some private goods benefit
from their gift per se” (Andreoni, 1989). This utility is in the form of the positive emotional
feeling that people receive from helping others, therefore named ‘warm-glow’. In this paper,
I will focus on studies that tested different components of warm-glow, and propose a study
design that attempts to identify responsibility to help as a factor that influences warm-glow
and altruistic behaviors.
Warm-Glow in experimental and field studies
At the basic level, various studies have used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
evidence to show that altruistic behavior (e.g. making a donation to charity) leads to brain
activity in regions related to pleasure and reward [Breiter et al., 2001; Vartanian and Goel,
2004; Harbaugh et al., 2007]. For example, Harbaugh et al. (2007) demonstrated that
making a decision to donate to the food bank led to activation in the ventral striatum, a
brain region associated with rewards. This evidence rendered support for the existence of
warm-glow as an action-associated, not the outcome-associated (which would be the case
of pure-altruism) reward.
Various studies took a step back to identify components or origination of warmglow motivation. One component of warm-glow seems to be social image concerns. Research
have shown that people derive pleasure from social acclaim: they aspire to appear generous
in the eyes of the others or themselves. For example, Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) used a
modified dictator game to demonstrate that giving is more likely when people believe their
altruistic acts will be more vivid in the mind of the recipient. They randomly divided and
assigned pairs into a dictator and recipient role and let each pair split a prize while varying
the probability of the nature to intervene (p) and set the transfer from dictator to some
fixed value, x0. Results showed that as their unselfish division became more visible to the
recipients (e.g. when p=0), dictators acted much more altruistically, rendering division of
close to a 50-50 split. Ariely et al. (2009) have also shown that the presence of monetary
incentives increased the subjects’ effort significantly in private condition, but not in public
condition, both in the experimental and field studies. These studies have demonstrated
that the desire to maintain positive social-image could strongly shape people’s altruistic
behaviors.
Some may argue that social image concern is associated with external motivation
in altruistic behaviors, as people may expect external rewards as a result of their behavior
(e.g. social and economic benefit you may get from social image enhancement). However,
there are several reasons why external motivation by itself cannot fully explain the
social image concern. First, it is difficult to argue that subjects in the studies above have
significantly changed their actions solely based on the slight chance that a positive social
image to a stranger, who is randomly-assigned to be the pair, will bring any external benefit.
Rather, as Evren et al. (2015) showed, people experience warm-glow in the form of pleasure
from social acclaim, regardless of its direct impact on their external payoffs. Therefore,
a more plausible explanation would be that subjects acted less altruistically when the
pleasure (warm-glow) they expect to derive from a positive social image is undermined
by visibility (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009) or monetary incentive (Ariely et al., 2009).
8
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Second, social-image concern seems to be at work even in complete absence of potential
extrinsic reward. Everett et al. (2014) demonstrated that making donations to charity a
default option resulted in more participants donating part of their income. The participants’
decisions were private and thus without any potential external reward. This demonstrates
that the participants, who perceived the default option as the social norm, chose to donate
their income in order to derive positive feeling from maintaining a positive social image
to themselves (Everett et al., 2014). These studies strongly demonstrate that social image
concern stands as an important component of warm-glow (Andreoni et al., 2015), although
multiple motivations including extrinsic motivation often simultaneously exert influence
on an altruistic behavior.
Another type of social concern that underlies the warm-glow is social distance.
Various studies have demonstrated that altruistic behaviors increase when social distance
from the prospective recipient is reduced [Hoffman et al., 1996; Bohnet and Frey, 1999]
and when subjects communicate [Xiao and Houser, 2005; Andreoni and Rao, 2011].
Some people may argue that reduction of social distance increases the subject’s perceived
need level of the recipient, thereby influencing assessments relevant to pure altruism
(outcome distribution) rather than warm-glow. However, Small and Loewenstein (2003)
demonstrated that even a very weak form of identifiability, which does not change the
subject’s perception of the recipient’s need level, increases altruistic behavior. For example,
in a modified dictator game, subjects were more willing to compensate others who lost their
money when they simply heard losers had been already determined than when they heard
losers will be determined (Small and Loewenstein, 2003). This suggests that reduced social
distance does not necessarily affect pure altruistic motive but promotes more prosocial
behavior through another channel: warm-glow.
But a question arises: how exactly does the reduced social distance increase warmglow? The answer lies in another big component of warm-glow, empathic concern. Multiple
researchers have demonstrated that altruistic acts are often preceded by empathic stimuli
[Batson, 1991; Batson et al., 1996; Preston and deWaal, 2002; Andreoni and Rao, 2011].
The resulted empathy leads to a tension between either giving and feeling good (warmglow) or not giving and feeling guilt. This explains how reduced social distance, which
often heightens the empathy, increases warm-glow as such tension is resolved by giving.
For example, Andreoni and Rao (2011) demonstrated that an imagined conversation is just
as effective as the real conversation with the prospective recipient in significantly increasing
giving relative to a control group. As the imagined conversation did not in any way increase
the need level of the situation (pure altruism) nor extrinsic reward from their giving
(external motive), this shows that emphatic stimulation in the imagined conversation
treatment has led to warm-glow and altruistic behaviors.
Emphatic concern as a component of warm-glow explains why people often strive
to avoid empathic stimuli. In a distribution game by Dana et al. (2006), many exited the
game even at a personal cost in an effort to avoid emphatic stimuli (considering what the
recipient may feel). In another field study at a shopping mall with two entrances, Andreoni
et al. (2015) implemented a 2 x 2 design where the solicitation style (only bell ringing
and bell ringing with a verbal request) and location of the solicitor (at one door only or
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at both doors) were manipulated for the annual Red Kettle campaign. The result shows
that about 25% would-be entrants avoided the verbal request by going around to another
door without a solicitor (Andreoni et al., 2015). These studies demonstrate that people
incur a significant cost to avoid emphatic stimuli because it creates a strong tension that
has to be resolved at some cost, either that of helping (and feeling warm glow) or feeling
guilt (and not helping). The studies also found that when such tension arises, many choose
to help and feel warm glow than to feel guilt from not helping. For example, Andreoni et
al (2015) found that verbal request dramatically increased both the number of givers (by
55%) and total donations (by 69%). Such results demonstrate that while emphatic stimuli
can be powerful in increasing warm glow and altruistic behaviors, it can also be aversive,
rendering practical implications to the charity fundraising strategies.
Potential area of study: responsibility to help and warm-glow
Studies both in experimental and field settings have demonstrated that both the desire
to maintain positive social image and the presence of emphatic stimuli increase warmglow. Scholars have successfully demonstrated how effective manipulation of different
variables can encourage more altruistic behaviors. For example, manipulation of default
effect (Everett et al., 2004) and visibility [Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009, Ariely et al., 2009]
have triggered the social image concern in warm-glow and thereby increased the total
amount of charity donations. On the other hand, manipulation of mood [Isen and Levin,
1972; Harris and Huang, 1973; Cialdini et al., 1987], social distance (Hoffman et al., 1996),
identifiability (Small and Loewenstein., 2003), inter-subject communication [Xiao and
Houser, 2005; Andreoni and Rao, 2011], and verbal request (Andreoni et al., 2015) have
triggered empathic stimuli, which led to increased altruistic giving both in experiments
and in real life settings (e.g. charity donations). However, the relationship between warmglow and many other factors are still unexplored and we identify responsibility to help as a
potential variable that influences warm-glow and altruistic behaviors.
In real life, people find themselves in different situations where they feel varying
degrees of responsibility to behave altruistically. For example, social expectation influences
degree of responsibility to help: people feel more responsible to offer one’s seat in a subway
to elders when it is a social norm than when it is not. In other situations, other factors such
as cause of the problem may influence perceived responsibility to help. For instance, people
may feel more responsible to help when they believe they have partially contributed to the
aggravation of the problem (e.g. water problems exacerbated by massive water waste in
developed countries) than when they think they are not related in any meaningful way (e.g.
the same problem caused by broken pipelines or ill-management by the local municipality).
The need to study the relationship between responsibility to help and warm-glow
grounds on real life observations that people seem to highly value an altruistic behavior
when the person does over and beyond one’s responsibility to help others. For example,
donating a kidney to a stranger tends to be more highly praised than donating one to a family
member, as people believe it is beyond one’s duty to help a stranger in such a sacrificing
way. Accordingly, people who derive warm-glow from maintaining a positive social image
would feel much warm-glow from going over and beyond their responsibility to help others
10
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than from fulfilling what others and themselves regard as a basic responsibility.
Such a potential relationship between responsibility to help and altruistic behavior has
sparsely been studied. In the early 1990s and 2000s, several studies have shown that people
demonstrate more prosocial behaviors when they believe to have a personal responsibility
to act [Baumeister et al, 1994; Rai and Fiske, 2001]. Harbaugh et al (2007) also sheds light
on this field through an fMRI scanning where voluntary giving clearly showed activation
of the reward-center in the brain while obligatory giving showed much less activation of
the same region. Such results hinted at the potential connection between responsibility to
help and warm-glow that compared to the one with low responsibility to help (voluntary),
a situation with high responsibility to help (obligatory) would lead to less warm-glow
(reward) from helping.
In recent years, some scholars began to study the relationship between warm-glow
and autonomy of one’s action. Weinstein and Ryan (2010) found that when people do not
have autonomy over their helping decision, they experience less emotional well-being after
the altruistic behavior. For example, when helping was autonomous, people experienced
improved mood after donating more money. However, when helping was obligated, people
felt slightly worse after donating more money. Moreover, Dunn et al (2014) found that
even one’s internalized moral standards can make people feel obligated to help, which leads
to less warm-glow than when the participants feel no obligation. Lastly, a recent study by
Erlandsson et al (2016) demonstrated that increased personal obligation to help reduces
anticipated warm glow from helping and increases anticipated guilt from not helping.
We want to take these findings further and test whether the degree of perceived
responsibility to help has an inverse correlation with the degree of anticipated warm-glow
from helping, specifically in the context of charity giving. In other words, we hypothesize
that the more one feels responsible to help a cause, the less warm-glow one would anticipate
from helping. We also want to test whether people give more often and in bigger amounts
when the perceived responsibility to donate to a charity is higher.
We believe testing our hypothesis could provide a significant insight about people’s
real-life donation decisions. Charities tend to make people feel responsible to give, in an
effort to call for more donations (e.g. you should donate because many others do so!). If our
hypothesis is true, such a tactic may elicit more short-term donation but would decrease
the warm-glow feeling that donors experience, which may reduce the chance of future
donations or long-term engagements. Such a tradeoff would provide productive insight to
charities in developing their long-term strategies.
Hypothesis
In our experimental design, we define warm-glow as a positive self-directed emotion that
arises from being the agent of the altruistic action. We will measure anticipated warm-glow
from an imagined altruistic behavior as a dependent variable, as studies have shown that
anticipated warm-glow serves as a strong indicator that predicts the actual future altruistic
actions, such as blood donations (Ferguson et al., 2008). Measuring anticipated warm-glow
from imagined altruistic behaviors with varying degrees of responsibility to help would
shed a meaningful light on people’s real-life altruistic behaviors and the motives.
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Our main hypothesis is that people would anticipate more warm-glow from a possible
altruistic action when the perceived responsibility to help is lower, and anticipate less warmglow when the perceived responsibility to help is higher. In other words, people would
anticipate more warm-glow feeling when they do over and beyond their responsibility to
help a cause. We also hypothesize that people will give more often when the perceived
responsibility to help is higher.
Experimental design and procedures
Participants
We will recruit American participants online using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Amazon
Mechanical Turk is a website that allows researchers to post a task and facilitate payments
to the subjects for completing the task. The advantage of this participant pool is that the
subjects are more representative of the general population than student samples. Moreover,
research has shown that Amazon MTurk provides reliable data (Buhrmester, Kwang &
Gosling, 2011).
Another advantage of using Amazon MTurk is that it prevents any direct
interaction between the experimenter and subject. This will reduce potential confounding
variables, such as possible social pressure from and empathy towards the experimenter
coming into play when the subjects make the donation decision.
Participants completing the experiment online will be paid $10 for their time,
with an option to donate a portion of the participation fee to UNICEF. Accordingly, the
final amount the participants would receive would be $10 - donation to UNICEF, which
the system will automatically process and pay out the corresponding amount. We will
collect the donations made by the subjects and deliver them to UNICEF, and will email the
participants the receipt of the donation.
For preliminary data, we recruited 137 students in University of Pennsylvania
through social media. They have participated in the preliminary study through an online
survey.
Distractor Task
The experiment involves an IQ test as a distractor task. At the beginning of the experiment,
subjects will read a script that says the primary goal of the experiment is to measure their
IQs (look at Appendix A for instructions and questions). They will be given 16 IQ test
questions to answer with a time limit of 20 minutes.
We have the IQ test as a distractor task with two main goals. First, we want the
subjects to feel justified in receiving the $10 participation fee for their task, as an IQ test
requires time and mental effort. This will give them a full sense of ownership over their
participation fee of $10, from which they will be making an allocation decision for an
altruistic cause. This will provide a more meaningful insight into people’s real-life altruistic
behaviors, where people donate money that are rightly owned and earned by themselves.
On the other hand, if they were simply given $10 at the beginning of the experiment and
were asked to allocate a portion of it to a charitable cause, people may consider it as “free
12
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money” and behave differently (e.g. more generous).
Second, the task will distract subjects from conjecturing the experimenters’
study design and goals. If we simply give out questions in the beginning that measure the
anticipated warm-glow, many subjects would be able to conjecture the main goal of the
study, which may lead some of them to act against their first-hand instincts. As we would
like to measure the most natural response to our questions with a goal to shed light on reallife behaviors, IQ tests will serve as a good distractor task that will make the subjects believe
that the warm-glow questions are simply a “post-experiment” survey. In fact, 85% of the
subjects in the preliminary study have answered that they could not guess the real purpose
of the experiment. We predict this proportion to be much higher in the real experiment as
some of the preliminary study participants were our personal affiliates who have previously
heard about our study.
Main task
After completing the distractor task, the subjects will move to a page where they will be
asked to fill out a brief “post-experiment” survey. This survey will be the “main task” of the
subjects from the experimenter’s perspective: we will test our hypothesis that the subjects
who are put in high-responsibility treatment would anticipate less warm-glow from their
imagined donation than those in low-responsibility condition who imagine donation of
the same amount. Nevertheless, people in high-responsibility condition are expected to
give more often.
The independent variable manipulated in this experiment will be degree
of responsibility to help. Subjects will be randomly assigned to read one of the three
scenarios: Control, High 1, High 2. In Control scenario, the responsibility to help a cause
will be manipulated to be low. In High scenarios, the responsibility to help a cause will
be manipulated to be high. High 1 and High 2 refer to different ways to manipulate
responsibility to help: in High 1, high responsibility to help will be generated by placing
strong social expectations of altruistic behaviors on the subject; in High 2 scenario, high
responsibility to help will be generated by framing that the subject has partly aggravated the
victim’s need situation. The following are scripts of the three scenarios.
Control
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please answer the following question
carefully for a brief post-experiment survey.
At this very moment, more than 1.8 billion people lack access to safe water, and 100
people die every hour from water-related diseases. Governments in those regions are often
incompetent to provide adequate infrastructure needed to solve water quality and supply
problems.
UNICEF, an international Nonprofit Organization, helps those people in need of water, and
we would like to support them by asking the participants to consider donating a portion of
their participation fee ($10).
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High 1 (Social Expectation)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please answer the following question
carefully for a brief post-experiment survey.
At this very moment, more than 1.8 billion people lack access to safe water, and 100
people die every hour from water-related diseases. Governments in those regions are often
incompetent to provide adequate infrastructure needed to solve water quality and supply
problem.
UNICEF, an international Nonprofit Organization, helps those people in need for basic
water, and we would like to support them by asking the participants to consider donating a
portion of their participation fee ($10). Most of the participants in the past have given some
portion of their participation fee to this cause.
High 2 (Cause of the problem)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please answer the following question
carefully for a brief post-experiment survey.
At this very moment, more than 1.8 billion people lack access to safe water, and 100 people
die every hour from water-related diseases. While an average African uses 1.25 gallons (4.5
Liters) of water each day, an average American uses 100 gallons (379 Liters) of water per
day, producing massive water waste that contributes to global water shortage.
UNICEF, an international Nonprofit Organization, helps those people in need for basic
water, and we would like to support them by asking the participants to consider donating a
portion of their participation fee ($10).
After the subjects have read the assigned scenario, we will measure three dependent
variables of this experiment: the anticipated warm-glow from an imagined donation, the
actual donation frequency and amount, and the perceived degree of responsibility to help
after reading the scenario. We will first measure the anticipated warm-glow, the primary
dependent variable, by asking the subjects to imagine how much warm, pleasurable feeling
they would experience if they have given $1, $5, and $10 out of their participation fee
($10). This will allow us to compare the anticipated warm-glow across the subjects in
three scenarios, as all the subjects would answer based on imagining the same amount of
donation. Each of the three questions (with different donation amount) will be placed on
a separate page in order to minimalize one question’s influence on the other. Moreover, we
manipulated the order of the question ($5 -> $1 -> $10) so that it would be difficult for the
subjects to anticipate a pattern and answer without much contemplation. The following are
scripts of the three questions.
(Page 1) Imagine that you have donated $5 out of your participation fee ($10) for this cause.
How much “warm, pleasurable feeling” would you experience from your donation to this
cause? (0 “not at all” to 10 “very warm”)
14
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(Page 2) Imagine that you have donated $1 out of your participation fee ($10) for this cause.
How much “warm, pleasurable feeling” would you experience from your donation to this
cause? (0 “not at all” to 10 “very warm”)
(Page 3) Imagine that you have donated $10 out of your participation fee ($10) for this
cause. How much “warm, pleasurable feeling” would you experience from your donation
to this cause? (0 “not at all” to 10 “very warm”)
After answering these questions, subjects will be asked on the next page to decide on the
actual donation amount to UNICEF, which will affect the actual payment that they will
receive at the end. On the following page, we will measure the subjects’ perceived degree of
responsibility to help this cause in order to assess whether we have successfully manipulated
the independent variable (high vs. low responsibility to help).
(Page 4) Would you like to donate a portion of your participation fee ($10) to UNICEF?
If yes, then how much? (out of $10)
*All the donations will be collectively delivered to UNICEF by the experimenters. All the
participants will receive an email receipt of the donation once it is made.
(Page 5) To what extent did you feel obligated to donate to this cause after reading about it?
(0: not at all obligated 10: very obligated)
After we have measured all dependent variables, we will ask for subjects’ background information (e.g. age, gender) and some procedural questions (Appendix B) aiming to measure
the effectiveness of the study design. The subjects will then be debriefed about the experiment and be paid $10 - donation amount on their Amazon Mturk account upon their
dismissal.
Rationale behind the order and content of questions
We designed this experiment to have the optimal order of questions that independently
measure three dependent variables: the anticipated warm-glow, actual donation frequency
and amount, and degree of responsibility to help. The anticipated warm-glow is the primary
dependent variable that we would like to test, so we tested it first to prevent intervention
from any other variables. Having donation decision or the perceived degree of responsibility
to help as our first question can potentially influence the subjects’ anticipated warm-glow,
due to Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger 1957) or the desire to be consistent with one’s
behaviors. Moreover, it is difficult for the subjects to make hypothetical considerations after
they already have made a donation.
We will measure the perceived degree of responsibility in the last question in order
to prevent its potential influence over the donation decision. As the degree of responsibility
to help is the main manipulation in this experiment, it is optimally important to prevent
the subjects from consciously factoring in this variable when they make decisions about
donation or the anticipated warm-glow. Accordingly, the ideal order of questions will be
anticipated warm-glow first, actual donation frequency and amount next, and finally the
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perceived degree of responsibility.
Lastly, when we measure the anticipated warm-glow, we will include three
imagined amounts of donation ($1, $5, $10) as an effort to reduce possible influence of one
amount as a reference point on the actual donation decision. Primacy and recency effect
(Murdock, 1962) demonstrate that the first and last imagined amount may still influence
the actual donation decision, but we believe the inclusion of three different imagined
amount would significantly reduce its potential influence on the actual donation.
Result
The result analyzed in this paper is based on the preliminary data that we have collected
over our online survey of 137 Upenn students. The participants of this preliminary study
were recruited through personal network and social media. Although this preliminary
study was not an experiment where the participants were paid, preliminary data analysis
will not only shed light on how we will approach analyzing the real experimental data but
also demonstrate that our study design effectively tests our hypothesis.
Out of the 137 survey results, 30 results were dismissed as the corresponding
participant either correctly guessed the main purpose of the experiment (21 cases) or left
the survey incomplete (9 cases). That provided us with with data of 107 samples (63 male,
44 female), out of which 38 were put into a Control treatment, 35 into a HIGH 1 (social
expectation) treatment, and 34 into a HIGH 2 (cause of the problem) treatment.
Result A- Perceived responsibility to help the cause (Figure 1)
Figure 1. Perceived responsibility to
Table 1. Perceived responsibility to
help the cause in three treatments
help the cause in three treatments

We first tested whether our manipulation of responsibility to help resulted in a significant
difference in perceived responsibility by the participants. T-test analysis of the preliminary
data showed that the manipulation was indeed successful. High 1 treatment (M = 5.23, SD
= 3.25) generated significantly higher responsibility to help than the Control treatment [M
= 3.97, SD = 3.11; t(73) = -1.69, p = 0.048]. High 2 treatment (M = 5.79, SD= 3.33) even
more successfully generated significantly higher responsibility to help than the Control
treatment [M = 3.97, SD = 3.11; t(72) = -2.40, p = 0.009]. As both results were statistically
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significant, we concluded that our manipulation of the independent variable (responsibility
to help) was successful.
Result B- Anticipated warm-glow from imagined donation to the cause (Figure 2)
Figure 2. Anticipated warm-glow from an imagined donation of three different amounts
Table 2. Anticpated warm-glow from an imagined donation of three different amounts

Table 3. T test result of anticpated warm-glow from an imagined donation of three different
amounts

As a next step, we analyzed our main dependent variable, anticipated warm-glow, in three
different treatments. Our finding suggests that when the participants imagined a small
donation ($1), those in Control treatment (M = 4.55, SD = 3.24) anticipated significantly
more warm-glow than High 2 [M = 3.12, SD = 2.74; t(72) = 2.02, p = 0.024]. The Control
treatment (M = 4.55, SD = 3.24) also generated more anticipated warm-glow than High 1
[M = 3.51, SD = 2.80; t(73) = 1.46, p = 0.07], although the difference was just a little short
to become statistically significant (p = 0.07 > 0.05).
When the participants imagined a sizable donation ($5), those in Control
treatment (M = 6.63, SD = 2.85) did anticipate more warm-glow than those both in High 1
[M = 5.94, SD = 2.59; t(73) = 1.08, p = 0.143] and High 2 [M = 6.03, SD = ; t(72) = 0.89, p
= 0.187]. However, the differences were not sufficient to be statically significant (p = 0.143
(High 1) > 0.05, 0.187 (High 2) > 0.05).
Lastly, when the participants imagined a full donation ($10) of their participation
fee, there was no significant difference among those in Control treatment (M = 7.63, SD =
2.45) and the High treatments (High 1: M = 7.71, SD = 2.84; High 2: M = 7.62, SD = 2.76).
Based on such results, we concluded that participants in the control treatment
anticipated more warm-glow from an imagined donation of $1 than those in High
responsibility treatments. There was no significant difference in warm-glow across
treatments when the participants imagined a larger amount of donation, such as $5 and
$10.
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Result C- Actual Donation frequency and amount for this cause (Figure 3)
Figure 3. Anticipated donation amount
Table 4. Anticipated donation amount out
out of the participation fee ($10)
of the participation fee ($10)

We then finally analyzed our last dependent variable, actual donation frequency and
amount, of the participants across three different treatments. In our preliminary study,
we could not precisely measure this variable as we did not provide the participants with
a participation fee ($10). Therefore, we instead asked the participants to imagine how
much they would have donated out of their participation fee ($10), if they had actually
participated in the experiment setting.
The result showed that participants in High responsibility treatments (High 1:
M = 7.43, SD = 2.85; High 2: M = 7.77, SD = 2.74) anticipated giving significantly more
than those in Control treatment [M = 5.90, SD = 3.14; p = 0.028 when Control vs. High
1; p = 0.008 when Control vs. High 2]. High 2 treatment had the highest proportion of
participants who are willing to donate (91.2%), followed by Control treatment (81.6%)
and High 1 treatment (80.0%).
Discussion of the preliminary data analysis
As we have not conducted the real experiment yet, it is beyond the scope of this paper to
discuss the significance of the preliminary data in support of the hypothesis. However,
we believe it is worthwhile to highlight some interesting aspects about the result of the
preliminary data analysis.
First, we found that the manipulation of perceived responsibility to help
was especially successful in High 2 treatment (p = 0.009) but much less so in High 1
treatment (p = 0.048). The analysis of the dependent variables (discussed in the following
paragraphs) demonstrate strong support for our hypothesis in High 2 treatment, but
less in High 1 treatment. We suggest improving the experimental design for High 1
treatment by strengthening the social expectations, that would in turn further increase
the perceived responsibility to help (e.g. adding a phrase “we strongly encourage you to
join other participants in helping those in need”).
Second, the analysis of the main dependent variable, anticipated warm-glow,
demonstrate that participants anticipated significantly more warm-glow in Control
treatment than in High 1 treatment (p = 0.024) when the imagined donation was small
($1). This finding supports our hypothesis that people anticipate much more warmglow from altruistic behaviors when their perceived responsibility to help is lower- in
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other words, when they go over and beyond their responsibility to help others. The possible
explanation as to why we do not observe such a strong pattern in higher amount of donations
($5 and $10) is that donating a significant portion of the participation fee (50% or 100% as
opposed to 10%) may itself be an altruistic behavior much beyond one’s responsibility. As
the participants perceive they have done more than required by their sense of responsibility,
they would feel significant warm-glow regardless of which treatment they are assigned to.
In order to test whether this explanation is valid, we could improve the experimental design
by measuring perceived responsibility to help for each of the three amounts of donations
(e.g. To what extent did you feel obligated to donate $1 to this cause after reading about it?
$5? $10?). The result of High 1 treatment showed a strikingly similar pattern, but it failed
to generate statically significant results. We believe improving the study design laid out in
the previous paragraph would render a statistically significant result for High 1 treatment
as well in the real experiment.
Third, analysis of the last dependent variable –actual donation frequency and
amount- in our preliminary data also demonstrated support for our hypothesis. Under a
strong responsibility manipulation (High 2 treatment), we found that high responsibility
to act resulted in a higher percentage of people making (hypothetical) donation. More
specifically, 91.2 % of participants in High 2 treatment made (hypothetical) donations,
compared to 81.6% of those in Control treatment (81.6%). We predict that more successful
responsibility manipulation in High 1 treatment (80.0%) would provide a similar support
for our hypothesis in the real experiment. Interestingly, High treatments (High 1: M =
7.43, SD = 2.85; High 2: M = 7.77, SD = 2.74) also showed significantly higher average
amount (hypothetically) donated than Control treatment (M = 5.90, SD = 3.14), which was
unexpected in our hypothesis. A possible explanation is that the amount donated reflects
the opportunity cost of feeling guilt from not donating, which is projected to be much
bigger in high responsibility conditions.
Limitations of the preliminary data
There are several limitations to our preliminary data analysis. First, the subjects in the
preliminary study participated without any material reward and without any time pressure
during the distractor task. As a result, participants lacked the incentive to maintain focus
throughout the study, as noted by some post-experiment feedback. In fact, we observed
some participants leaving early in the survey or making illogical answers to the questions,
such as anticipating the warm-glow the most when the imagined donation amount was
the least ($1). We believe that such seeming lack of focus was the primary reason why
we could not see a successful responsibility manipulation in High 1 treatment, where the
manipulation (adding just one line “most of the participants have donated some portion…”)
was not as outright noticeable as High 2 treatment (“Average American uses…”). In the
real experiment, we believe the subjects who now get paid will have a stronger incentive
and sense of guilt (from not putting in full effort) that would motivate them to maintain
focus throughout the experiment. We predict that better effort by the subjects along with
stronger manipulation of responsibility will lead to a successful manipulation in High 1
treatment as well.
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Second, our current study design does not fully remove confounding variables,
such as influence of one dependent variable over the other. As we explained in the previous
section, we measured three different dependent variables in an order that minimize such
confounding effects. We note that an ideal design would conduct three different experiments,
each pertaining to measuring one specific dependent variable, as other researchers did in a
similar experiment (Erlandsson et al., 2016).
Conclusion
Our study design tests whether a successful manipulation of the degree of responsibility
to help leads to a meaningful difference in the anticipated warm-glow from an imagined
donation. More specifically, we hypothesize that when the responsibility to help is higher,
people would give more frequently but would anticipate less warm-glow from an imagined
donation. This is because we observe people value an altruistic action more highly if they
act over and beyond their responsibility.
Our preliminary data suggests that there is a potential for a strong case for our
hypothesis. Under successful manipulation of responsibility (High 2 treatment), the data
showed strong support for our hypothesis. The preliminary data has several limits of its
own, but we believe those limits could be addressed in the real experiment to provide a
meaningful result.
We believe our study would provide significant insight about people’s real-life
altruistic actions, specifically how perceived responsibility to help plays a part in donation
decisions. To many charities that use various techniques to make people feel responsible
to give, our study suggests that such a tactic may elicit more short-term donations but
may decrease the warm-glow feeling that donors experience. This could potentially hamper
a serious, long-term engagement of donors who are often driven by strong warm-glow
feelings.
Appendix A: Distractor Task
Script
The participants coming into the experiment will read the following script on an online
page, then will proceed to the next page to start the experiment.
You will be asked to complete a short-IQ test for the next 20 minutes. The goal of this
experiment is to measure IQ test score spreads. A simple after-experiment survey will be
followed at the end. All of your responses will be kept anonymous.
Questions
The questions for the distractor task came from www.free-iqtest.net, the website where it
provides free IQ test questions.
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Question
Number

Question

Answer Choices

1

Which one of the five is least like the other four?

- Dog
- Mouse
- Lion
- Snake
- Elephant

2

Which one of the five choices makes the best comparison? PEACH is to HCAEP as 46251 is to:

- 25641
- 26451
- 12654
- 51462
- 15264

3

Which one of the numbers does not belong in the
following series?
2 - 3 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 14 - 15 - 30

- Three
- Seven
- Eight
- Fifteen
- Thirty

4

Which one of the five choices makes the best comparison?
Finger is to Hand as leaf is to:

- Twig
- Tree
- Branch
- Blossom
- Bark

5

Choose the number that is 1/4 of 1/2 of 1/5 of 200:

-2
-5
- 10
- 25
- 50

6

John needs 13 bottles of water from the store. John
can only carry 3 at a time. What’s the minimum
number of trips John needs to make to the store?

-3
-4
- 4.5
-5
-6

7

Choose the word most similar to
“Trustworthy”:

- Resoulute
- Tenacity
- Relevant
- Insolent
- Reliable
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8

If you rearrange the letters “LNGEDNA” you have
the name of a(n):

- Animal
- Country
- State
- City
- Ocean

9

If all Bloops are Razzies and all Razzies are Lazzies,
then all Bloops are definitely Lazzies?

- True
- False

10

Which one of the numbers does not belong in the
following series?
1 - 2 - 5 - 10 - 13 - 26 - 29 - 48

-1
-5
- 26
- 29
- 48

11

Ralph likes 25 but not 24; he likes 400 but not 300; he - 10
likes 144 but not 145. Which does he like?
- 50
- 124
- 200
- 1600

12

What is the missing number in the sequence shown
below?
1 - 8 - 27 - ? - 125 - 216

- 36
- 45
- 46
- 64
- 99

13

Which one of the following things is list is the least
like the others?

- poem
- novel
- painting
- statue
- flower

14

Which number should come next in the series?
1 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 5 - 8 - 13

-8
- 13
- 21
- 26
- 31

15

Mary, who is sixteen years old, is four times as old as
her brother. How old will Mary be when she is twice
as old as her brother?

- 20
- 24
- 25
- 26
- 28
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16

If you rearrange the letters “CIFAIPC” you would
have the name of a(n):

- city
- animal
- ocean
- river
-country

Appendix B: Procedure questions
1. The procedures followed in this experiment protected your anonymity (0: not at all 5:
definitely yes)
2. The money you passed to UNICEF will be sent to UNICEF (0: not at all 5: definitely yes)
3. The instructions for the experiment were clear and easy to understand (0: not at all 5:
definitely yes)
4. The recipients of your donation to UNICEF are deserving of support (0: not at all 5:
definitely yes)
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